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Unintended Effects of Immigration Policies for Gov-
ernments and Migrants: Conclusions 
Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, Kerstin Rosenow 
We started this book with the observation that the European and North 
American democracies fear the negative effects of their attraction to potential 
migrants from all over the world. They wish to channel and control migration 
and thereby shape the world according to their own policies and interests. To 
be able to do so, they have to engage in both national and international politi-
cal bargaining processes that are tied to contemporary forms of migration 
management. Such negotiations usually fail to focus on the subjects of the 
policy choices—the migrants themselves. The aim of this book project is to 
shed light upon the interrelations between immigration policies and migrants’ 
choices of moving across and around borders. As stated in the introduction, 
we want to understand how immigration policies affect migrant’s journeys 
and vice versa. 
In this chapter, we draw empirical and theoretical conclusions based on 
the various analyses contained in this volume that focus on the European and 
U.S. migration regimes. We conclude that immigration policies have a multi-
tude of unintended effects which affect both migrants and governments in the 
countries of origin, transit, and arrival. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the interest policies inside and 
outside the ‘defended’ territories. In the U.S. a lucrative internal market of 
border control has emerged, whereas the EU’s externalized border control 
includes the neighboring countries. The second part describes the unintended 
effects arising due to inconsistent general policies of the countries of arrival 
and origin, which often contradict the official immigration policies. Follow-
ing this, the limited effect of border control measures on immigrants and 
their journeys are discussed. In the fourth section we explore in more detail 
the unintended effects in the form of new areas of cooperation, including 
new forms of self-organization, local interest groups, and sanctuary move-
ments. The final section summarizes the various unintended effects and of-
fers recommendations for decision makers in the field of migration policy. 
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Interest Policies Inside and Outside ‘Defended’ Territories 
The articles reveal that all of the actors involved in the migration control pro-
cess—countries of arrival, origin, and transit, as well as the immigrants them-
selves—pursue their own interests. Both of the two receiving regions under 
examination, the EU and the U.S., employ a defensive approach to immigra-
tion control. One could say that the aim of their policies is to build a castle 
with a moat around it. However, while the U.S. focuses on domestic solu-
tions to defend its borders, the EU has increasingly externalized its border 
control, creating unintended effects concerning the necessary political nego-
tiations with its neighboring countries, as discussed below. 
The U.S. chooses a rather militaristic defense strategy to protect its terri-
tory from unwanted ‘intruders’ who come mainly from and via its southern 
neighbor Mexico. In 2006, the U.S. government decided to erect a 700-mile 
border fence along the U.S.–Mexican frontier (US 2006)1. This is the latest in 
a series of restrictive policies aimed at preventing undocumented immigrants 
from crossing the border to the U.S. by controlling und monitoring the bor-
der. Similar to the EU, the U.S. border control and surveillance measures are 
extremely technology-driven. Border surveillance has become a highly lucra-
tive business. Private corporations involved in this market pay big money to 
support their allies in the U.S. Congress and to lobby for a continuation of 
the walling-off of the country (see Staudt/Garcia-Rios in this volume). Immi-
gration control thus follows its own economic dynamics, which is also stimu-
lated by anti-immigrant reporting in the media. The U.S. control and surveil-
lance efforts are supported by certain segments of the population. As 
Staudt/Garcia-Rios and Bloch/Rocha Silva point out, civil society actors 
have also been involved in reporting illegal border crossings and supporting 
national border guards. 
The EU is also attempting to protect itself from unwanted migrants by 
strengthening the control of its borders around its territory (EU 2006; 2008a). 
It has established various protective/defensive circles around its territory that 
are reminiscent of the moats around medieval castles, the castle wall being its 
external borders and the moat the EU’s neighboring countries and the more 
distant third countries. This form of externalization is one key characteristic 
of the EU’s migration control policy which Gil Araújo analyzes in her article. 
This means that migration control has been complemented by control 
measures outside EU territory. These politics of “concentric circles” were 
1 The government of Greece, the main entrance to the EU for undocumented 
migrants from Turkey, recently planned to copy the U.S.-American fence. 
Although the EU Commission disapproved of this plan, it became clear that 
some actors within the EU favor a U.S.-like militaristic defense strategy to deal 
with undocumented migration. 
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introduced by the Austrian EU presidency in 1998. A major general objective 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU’s global approach 
to migration (EU 2008b) is to involve the neighboring countries in the con-
trol of migration to the EU in order to “strengthen prosperity, stability and 
security of all” (European Comission: European Neighbourhood Policy). The 
EU even goes one step further, by trying to persuade transit countries and mi-
grants’ countries of origin to assist the EU in controlling migration. A major 
economic and political player, the EU does not hesitate to use its power. It 
negotiates on the basis of a reward system, with the main reward being EU 
accession. 
However, countries of origin and transit pursue their own interests as 
well. Like any other country, they are interested in increasing and promoting 
prosperity. They rarely have a genuine interest in preventing (transit) migra-
tion to the EU or U.S. and only assume the role of ‘deputy sheriff’ if they are 
under political pressure or if there is a genuine economic or political incen-
tive. Several articles in this volume suggest that such states act as economic 
entrepreneurs and therefore may have a rational interest in preventing more 
of its citizens from emigrating in order to enhance their bargaining power 
and to increase rewards for their efforts to curb emigration. 
Morocco, a transit country, even benefits from irregular migration. Heck 
has found that many sub-Saharan migrants find themselves stranded in Mo-
rocco while trying to reach Europe. The EU pays Morocco €70 million per 
year to protect its borders and prohibit undocumented migration to Europe. 
This deal has led to a strange system of gratification. Morocco justifies these 
generous payments by the large number of apprehensions at its borders. 
There is but one problem: According to Heck, the Moroccan border guards 
systematically defraud the European authorities of large amounts of money 
by playing a cat-and-mouse game. They catch the same migrants over and 
over again, take them a few kilometers behind the border, and wait for them 
to pass through Morocco again, thus altering the statistics in favor of Moroc-
co every time the Moroccan guards catch them, which justifies additional 
payments from the EU. 
In her investigation of political incentives Bilecen-Süoglu shows that the 
prospect of EU accession was one of the key motivating factors for Turkey to 
change and restrict its migration regime, highlighting Turkey’s difficulties in 
defining a genuine national interest in migration matters. Turkey actively 
sought to comply with the EU’s demands, notably the implementation of the 
Schengen acquis, until it became evident that the EU member states are di-
vided over whether Turkey should become a full EU member. Since then, 
Turkey has significantly reduced its efforts to implement EU standards. In-
deed, if it turned out in a few years that Turkey’s accession to the EU is all 
but certain, the country may actually lose all motivation to further strengthen 
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and restrict migration to the EU. For transit migrants, Turkey’s position in 
the European migration regime is of utmost importance. Turkey is the bridge 
between Asia and Europe and is still an important route for regular and irreg-
ular migration to the EU. 
Haase has made similar observations. Ukraine, formerly a transit coun-
try, has become a reluctant country of arrival since it started implementing 
the migration control measures demanded by the EU. As a result, it has be-
come an ‘immigration country of second choice’, for migrants who are on 
their way to the EU and who often find themselves stranded in Ukraine. 
However, the country lacks the infrastructure and experience to deal with 
immigrants, and the existing xenophobic trends in Ukraine have become 
worse as a result of this situation. Although Ukraine hopes for EU accession 
and is therefore willing to deal with this situation, it would be wrong to in-
terpret its efforts to implement EU standards as docile eagerness to please the 
EU. After all, Ukraine was quite able to pursue its own interests in the nego-
tiations of EU visa facilitation for Ukrainian nationals in exchange for the 
readmission agreement demanded by the EU. 
Obviously, the carrot-and-stick strategy of the EU may prove rather cost-
ly, including the possible unintended effects described above. The economic 
approach of rewarding its neighbors and other transit countries for complying 
with its political objectives often works out only on paper. Moreover, the EU 
risks getting blackmailed. It expects the major transit countries such as Mo-
rocco, Turkey, and Ukraine to do the ‘dirty work’ of keeping migrants out. 
But transit states are rational actors. The willingness of these countries to 
comply with the EU’s demands depends on the (perceived) benefits and costs 
in each transit state. If these countries were to find that their costs exceed 
their benefits, they might ask the EU for greater financial compensation. 
They may also cooperate with each other to put the EU under severe pres-
sure. Countries with limited prospects of EU accession such as Turkey and 
Ukraine would have little to lose. Hess’s article in this volume also highlights 
the unintended outcome of the EU transit policies since “the newly labeled 
‘transit countries’ learn to use this categorization for their own power 
games.” Future policy planning should take these observations into consider-
ation. 
Unintended Effects of Inconsistent Policies and Economic 
Interests: The Encouragement of Ongoing Emigration 
Migration policies of the U.S. and the EU member states are influenced pri-
marily by economic interests which very often contradict the zero-tolerance 
approach to undocumented migration. As the following overview shows, 
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economic interests prevail both in the countries of origin and arrival, which 
also highlights the inconsistent nature of existing anti-migration policies. 
Kreienbrink describes the interest of the Spanish government in regular-
izing migrants. In his analysis he identifies Spain’s labor market as the 
strongest pull factor to produce unintended effects on EU migration policy. 
State authorities generally fail to maintain effective internal control, particu-
larly in the agricultural and construction industries, both of which have a 
constant demand for new labor. This tolerance towards irregular labor gives 
Spain certain competitive advantages on the macroeconomic level, with pos-
sible regularization providing an additional incentive for undocumented mi-
grants to come to Spain. Regularization attempts in Spain and a number of 
other European countries aimed at furthering national economic interests 
therefore contradict the EU’s immigration policies 
In Mexico, the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
with the U.S. (NAFTA) in 1994 only yielded marginal improvements. In 
fact, it even prevented the intended effects of the anti-migration measures. 
According to Staudt and Garcia-Rios, it led to increased foreign direct invest-
ments and overall productivity, and reduced inflation. However, NAFTA was 
not able to create sustainable jobs at living-wage levels, which would have 
made emigration to the U.S. less attractive. Mexicans living in the U.S. trans-
fer large portions of their income home to their families. Unsurprisingly, the-
se remittances are the second most important source of income in Mexico, 
just after oil exports and before foreign direct investments (Randall 2006). 
Mexican remittances figures grew to US$27 billion in 2007 and decreased to 
US$22 billion in 2009 and 2010 (World Bank 2011). Emigration to the U.S. 
is supported by the Mexican State because migrants remain one of the most 
important sources of revenue for the Mexican economy. 
The case of Senegal reveals another paradox of inconsistent policies. 
Tsagué shows in this volume that several measures implemented by the EU 
and European enterprises have aggravated the living conditions in Senegal 
and have thus proved to be a push factor for emigration to Europe. A good 
example of this is the overexploitation of the sea along the Senegalese coast 
by European enterprises, which has been partially tolerated and compensated 
financially by EU member states2. A very poor country, Senegal is in a rela-
tively weaker negotiation position. When the EU cynically asks Senegal to 
implement measures to prevent irregular emigration – which, after all, was at 
least partially triggered by European intervention – the Senegalese govern-
ment is very cooperative because it hopes for better access to the internal EU 
market and for stronger relations with the EU. Senegal even boasts about its 
2 See Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Government of the Republic of Senegal on fishing off the coast of Senegal, for 
the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2006, OJ L 349/45. 
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excellent exit control, despite the fact that this contradicts Senegal’s national 
interests. Similar to the situation in Mexico, remittances from Senegalese 
emigrants are of utmost importance for the country’s national economy, but 
are jeopardized due to tougher controls. As in other countries of transit and 
origin, this political dilemma has several consequences for the society of 
Senegal. In the Senegalese culture, the decision to send the member of the 
family who is most likely to succeed in Europe is made by the family collec-
tive, who consider their support as an investment. Pressure on the migrants is 
very high and many of them do not dare return to Senegal because they fear 
they will be unable to meet the high expectations. If the Senegalese govern-
ment wants to bring them back and prevents others from leaving, it has to set 
up a return policy which can be accepted by the local population and create 
jobs for those who were designated to leave and must now stay at home. 
One can conclude that inconsistent EU and U.S. policies are policies 
which aggravate the living conditions in potential emigration regions rather 
than improving them. Negative externalities of such policies as well as na-
tional and individual economic interests can significantly reduce the effi-
ciency of anti-migration measures. 
Unintended Effects on Migrants’ Behavior: The Limited Ef-
fects of Border Control 
According to the World Migration Report 2010, the number of international 
migrants has more than doubled in the last four decades, from 82 million in 
1970 to about 214 million in 2010 and a projected 405 million in 2050 (IOM 
2010: xix). With the growth of international migration occurring at a time of 
increasingly restrictive admission policies, unauthorized migration has 
picked up dramatically in recent years. Nevertheless, it is estimated that only 
between 10 and 15% of today’s international migrants live in an irregular 
situation (Ibid: 29). 
The articles in this volume confirmed empirically that physical barriers 
do not discourage people from crossing borders. This finding is supported by 
statements of migrants who succeeded in crossing the border. Naturally, the 
deterrence capacity of border control and surveillance is difficult to assess, 
but the interviews with the would-be migrants suggest that the deterrence 
capacity of border security is limited. Obviously, border control measures are 
unlikely to deter migrants from migrating if they perceive that they have 
nothing to lose at home and much to gain in the country of destination. Bor-
der fences can do little to keep them from emigrating. 
In fact, the articles show that migrants are led by reason and use every 
means at their disposal to pursue their objectives. The concept of agency—in 
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the sense of the migrant acting as a Homo economicus—thus makes sense for 
migrants, too. Most migrants show a high degree of initiative and the will to 
actively shape their lives. In most cases, they are self-determined subjects. 
Or, to put it conversely: Migrants are not objects that can be controlled by 
political actors at will. As Friese and Hess point out in their contributions, 
migrants make their own decisions; they trade off different options and im-
plement their objectives. This requires survival skills, personal resources, and 
capabilities. For these reasons, a description of migrants should not portray 
them as victims or as a threat to the security and welfare of Western industri-
al nations, but as active agents. 
The argument that border control has a limited effect on migrants’ be-
havior is also supported by Staudt and Garcia-Rios, albeit from a different 
perspective. They identify economic factors as the main explanatory variable 
for immigration rates from Mexico to the U.S. According to their study, bor-
der or immigration policies, as far as they exist, are only an intervening vari-
able. Border control and surveillance do influence the way migrants move, 
but they hardly have any influence on the decision of whether to emigrate or 
not. As in the Spanish case, economic and immigration policies in the U.S. 
are not only non-convergent, they are contradictive. While immigration poli-
cies try to prevent or even ‘fight’ irregular migration, the constantly high 
demand for low-wage labor in the U.S. is a strong incentive for Mexicans to 
migrate despite legal obstacles. 
This estimation is complemented by Cornelius, who notes that “immigra-
tion law and policy are huge experiments in behavior modification”. He 
points out the helplessness of governments and their inability to intervene in 
international migration flows, stressing that it is easier for governments to 
initiate migration flows than to stop them. The budget for the virtual fence 
between the U.S. and Mexico is tremendous. However, Cornelius’ interviews 
with 4,000 Mexicans in Mexico show that fewer than half of them have been 
caught crossing the border irregularly. Moreover, border control does not 
make potential migrants reconsider their decision to emigrate. The economic 
incentives provided in the U.S. are too attractive and the living conditions in 
Mexico and further south are too harsh. 
The decrease in illegal migration from Mexico to the U.S. in recent years 
is due mainly to the economic crisis in the U.S. and the lack of employment. 
Neither interior enforcements such as workplace raids nor a hostile environ-
ment affect migrants’ decisions to go to the U.S. as strongly. Even many 
green card holders have left the U.S. But this is not a permanent situation. 
Cornelius makes it clear that “many stay-at-homes are only postponing mi-
gration until the U.S. economy improves.”Again, it is the economic interests 
of some employers that conflict with the government’s or society’s intention 
to control and deter undocumented Mexican immigrants. 
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The same is true for Spain where, according to Kreienbrink, the phenom-
enon of irregular labor is widely accepted in small enterprises. The possibil-
ity of finding employment and being regularized is a strong incentive for mi-
grants to cross borders illegally. Even if regularization is only temporary, it is 
often a step toward obtaining legal status and noticeably improving their eco-
nomic and social situation. 
In order to avoid the tightened border control, migrants usually take al-
ternative routes, which are becoming increasingly difficult and dangerous. 
While border control and surveillance may not prevent immigration alto-
gether, they do have an influence on which people migrate, and how they do 
so. Many migrants are unable to make their journey on their own and have to 
seek the ‘professional support’ of people smugglers. This has led to the 
emergence of a new smuggling market in Europe and at the U.S.–Mexican 
border over the last two decades. Smuggling profits are even increasing, be-
cause the product offered by these entrepreneurs, the chance to cross the bor-
der, has become increasingly difficult to obtain. 
At the same time, the number of deaths attributed to unauthorized border 
crossings—i.e., crossings excluding entries with forged passports or cross-
ings with unlawfully obtained visas—is on the increase worldwide. Several 
thousand people drown or die of thirst on both sides of the Atlantic each 
year. According to the NGO UNITED for Intercultural Action, there were 
13,824 fatal border crossing attempts into the EU between 1993 and 2010 
(www.unitedagainstracism.org). Figures for the U.S. are equally dramatic 
with an average of more than one migrant dying every day along the south-
western border, resulting in over 5,600 officially casualties so far (see Cor-
nelius). 
On the whole, one can conclude that the decision to migrate is accompa-
nied by serious unintended effects, such as the emergence of people smug-
gling and other related crimes, increasing casualty rates, and people being 
stripped of their individual rights due to their irregular status. With regard to 
the controversial establishment of EU “transit zones”, which are “designated 
places where rejected migrants are physically detained until they are re-
turned” (Tóth 2006), it has been critically remarked that irregular migrants 
are kept from “the full panoply of procedural rights which apply to immigra-
tion and asylum” despite the fact that they are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the territorial state, which remains bound by its international obligations on 
human rights (Ibid.). Similarly, in this volume Hess criticizes the manifesta-
tion of precarious transit zones, which “keep people caught in mobility and 
transforms border regions into zones of increased circulation […] [that] re-
strict the social, economic, and political rights of migrants”. 
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Unintended Effects on Alliance Building and the Pending 
Issue of Legal Rights 
Another unintended consequence of migration policies are the new forms of 
alliance building among the migrants themselves which have developed in 
recent years but have not yet been adequately described in the academic liter-
ature. In addition, the establishment of legal rights for undocumented mi-
grants still remains a contentious issue both in the U.S. and the EU. 
Concerning the new forms of alliance building, the articles in this vol-
ume observe that migrants on both sides of the Atlantic find new forms of 
self-organization and micro-politics to deal with their situation of being in 
transit. In Morocco, for example, irregular migrants live together in the ‘un-
derground’ in small groups of approximately 10 people. In the desert and in 
the outskirts of the cities migrants set up makeshift camps. This shows that a 
completely new form of residence has emerged in Morocco, a fact the Mo-
roccan government refuses to acknowledge. Similar forms of makeshift resi-
dences can be observed in Turkey and Ukraine. Ukraine in particular, with its 
extremely strict border control and surveillance, has become a country where 
many former transit migrants find themselves stranded and now have to learn 
to manage their lives there. These cases confirm the observation made in the 
preliminary studies to this book that migrants organize their lives ‘around’ 
border control measures. 
Friese describes another form of alliance building that has emerged on 
the island of Lampedusa. In 2009, something extraordinary happened on the 
tiny island in the Mediterranean Sea off the Italian coast. Tourism is one of 
the most important sources of revenue for Lampedusa, but the industry is 
severely hampered by border surveillance measures on and around the island. 
In addition, Lampedusa experienced increasing numbers of migrants arriving 
on its coast. Reception camps were soon overcrowded, and the Lampedusani 
felt abandoned by the Italian government. When the Lampedusani and the 
migrants realized they could no longer tolerate this situation, they joined 
forces and took to the streets of the tiny island together to demonstrate 
against the policy of the Berlusconi government. 
The sanctuary movement in the U.S., though having a different motiva-
tion, has had a similar outcome in that it, too, has led to joint demonstrations 
against stricter immigration policies. In 2006, for example, both documented 
and undocumented Mexican-born residents demonstrated against stricter im-
migration policies. According to the article by Bloch and Rocha Silva, the 
sanctuary movement was initiated by various churches in Los Angeles in the 
early 1980s. Its aim was to offer asylum for Central American immigrants in 
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churches and synagogues as places for worship and refuge. U.S. citizens who 
join this movement protect immigrants from detention and deportation3. 
It should be noted that the examples of Lampedusa and the U.S. sanctu-
ary movement are the exceptions that prove the rule. Xenophobic attitudes 
prevail and the preservation of distinct national identities in EU member 
states and the U.S. usually prevent the liberalization of immigration policies. 
However, even where undocumented migrants are not welcome, the regional 
population and the governments of the countries of arrival have to deal with 
them. In the long run, they have to consider fundamental issues such as indi-
vidual rights, health care, and education for undocumented immigrants and 
their children, as well as for potential migrants who are still waiting for their 
chance. 
At least to some degree, the rights of undocumented migrants are pro-
tected under international human rights law (Council of Europe 2007), but 
the translation into specific EU measures is still lagging behind. Cholewinski 
notes that, so far, “no specific EU measures have been adopted to protect the 
rights of irregular migrants, despite statements that fundamental rights, such 
as access to education for children or basic health care, need to be protected” 
(Cholewinski 2010: 7f.). In the U.S., alien rights of undocumented immi-
grants have been a matter of controversy as well. While Joppke (2001: 
343ff.) points out that in the 1970s and 1980s American courts generally 
used to rule in favor of equal protection rights for illegal aliens, Bloch and 
Rocha Silva (in this volume) focus on ballot initiatives at the state level that 
were aimed at banning “undocumented aliens from using health care, wel-
fare, and other public social services”, the most prominent example being 
Proposition 187 in California in 1994. Although this proposition was eventu-
ally found unconstitutional, the debate on the issue of alien rights between 
federal, state, and local legislation still continues today (Thomas 2010). An 
interesting question for future research would be to examine the role mi-
grants and their alliances can play in this process (Hing/Johnson 2006; Lau-
benthal 2007). 
Summary and Outlook 
The analyses presented in this book indicate that the objective of the U.S. 
and the EU to only allow friends, acquaintances, traders, and business part-
ners to enter their territory has not been achieved. This observation confirms 
the reports cited in the introduction, of about 1.9 to 3.8 million undocument-
3 For a parallel analysis of the European case and its pro-regularization movement 
see Laubenthal 2007. 
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ed migrants living in the EU, and over 10 million in the U.S. However, bor-
der control and surveillance have become increasingly sophisticated on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Many enterprises have a great interest in serving deci-
sion makers who have a strong enthusiasm for technology. Border manage-
ment has become a business factor and, at least from a technical point of 
view, an impermeable border seems to be feasible. 
However, the analyses collected in this volume also raise serious doubts 
as to the efficiency of such a strategy. The existing migration management 
strategies and inconsistent general policies are already creating various unin-
tended effects. The castle and moat structure described in this chapter is risky 
and very costly. Inconsistent policies encourage ongoing emigration, but 
tightened border control does not prevent people from migrating. Rather, the 
supposedly ‘impermeable borders’ often give rise to new forms of crime such 
as people smuggling, which can increase the de facto punishment for undoc-
umented migration to the death penalty, as can be seen from the deaths of 
thousands of migrants who have attempted to cross the borders in recent 
years. At the same time, changing policies also stimulate the emergence of 
new forms of alliances and self-organization which can strengthen the mi-
grants’ resources and challenge traditional path-dependent institutions on the 
regional level. Alliances between migrants are formed throughout their entire 
journey and continue when dealing with civil society or local residents who 
support their claims. 
Increased technical control measures would only partly prevent these un-
intended effects because migration policies are complex, cross-sectoral phe-
nomena. Even small adjustments in one policy area can have an immediate 
effect on others. The approach of today’s migration policy, which tends to 
ignore migrants’ interests, the status quo in the countries of origin and transit, 
and the national interests of all of the countries involved, is often too simplis-
tic and one-dimensional and should therefore be readjusted. 
The reasonableness of increasingly strict border regimes becomes even 
more doubtful when we take into account that migration management is the 
result of political decisions based on many other aspects not covered in this 
book. Most Western societies fear that increased migration may result in cul-
tural and religious Überfremdung, the collapse of social security systems, an 
influx of low-wage foreign laborers, and a xenophobic backlash, among oth-
er things. Politicians take these attitudes into account when making policy 
decisions. There are various examples of the “negative framing of migration” 
(Guiraudon/Joppke 2001). Casanova (2006) discusses the fear of terrorism 
and sleepers, liberal feminist discourses against imported patriarchal funda-
mentalism, the preservation of a secular tradition in Europe, and a xenopho-
bic nativism. Huysmans (2000) talks about the fear of welfare fraud and the 
use of immigrants as scapegoats to explain the struggling welfare systems 
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(cf. Beck 2008). Similarly, Weiner (1995) cites sources which portray mi-
grants as a social or economic burden and a possible threat to cultural identi-
ty. 
We argue that instead of approaching migration in traditional national 
categories, a global approach taking into account the inherent global and in-
terconnected facts of migration might create a win-win situation. Receiving 
societies could benefit from the migrants’ knowledge and experience. Partic-
ularly in times of demographic change, these societies can benefit from eco-
nomic migrants while simultaneously increasing the safety of migrants. His-
tory clearly shows that multicultural and multiethnic societies are the most 
advanced. However, the possible consequences of a brain drain for the coun-
tries of origin have to be taken into account as well, particularly for labor-
sending countries that are situated close to labor-receiving countries (Adams 
2003). 
Finally, this volume also confirms the institutionalist assumption that 
even systems with a negative or doubtful performance can be stable and deci-
sion makers may not be aware of better alternatives. There are several rea-
sons for this phenomenon: The longer a system exists the higher the costs of 
changing it, because all actors and contexts have adapted to the situation (Da-
vid 1985; North 1990). For example, in repeated interaction situations the 
actors’ ideas tend to converge. Even where many actors are dissatisfied with 
the status quo and would like to change it, failure to compromise on alterna-
tives can make it impossible to effect any changes at all. Path dependency is 
substantiated with the theoretical argument that short-term cycles of issues 
covered by the media, medium-term cycles of issues at the political agenda, 
and long-term cycles of values of the society are often incompatible. This 
leads to the unintended effect that decision makers avoid adjusting political 
institutions (Wiesenthal 2002). 
So even if the EU and the U.S. were to realize that their migration poli-
cies and inconsistent general policies have various unintended effects, it is 
likely that they will not readjust their policies because the sequence of past 
events and decisions pre-structures the options for change. Changes to the 
‘path’ are possible, but they should not be expected to come about easily. 
Such changes are more likely to occur as a result of ‘exogenous shocks’ 
(Beyer 2005), such as if transit countries which have adopted EU-style mi-
gration control measures started to blackmail the EU. 
The nation-based design of this policy is another factor impeding change 
in migration control policies. It usually takes a long time for (collective) ide-
as and core beliefs to change (Scott/Meyer 1994: 234). Migration control is 
still adjusted along the concept of the Westphalian state, a nation state whose 
territory needs to be protected from external enemies. However, more so than 
any other movement, migration is a cross-border or even a transnational phe-
nomenon (Basch et al. 1997). The various aspects of transnational networks, 
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which can have cultural, economic, political, or religious dimensions extend-
ing between and beyond two or more geographical spaces (Pries 2001; 
2008), must therefore be considered comprehensively, without the limitation 
of ‘methodological nationalism’. 
In view of the more than 1,000 official deaths at EU and U.S. borders 
every year, it remains a delicate and very important task to reach a consensus 
on the question of whether liberal countries or state unions which are dedi-
cated and committed to protecting human rights, such as the U.S. and the EU, 
respectively, can bend their liberal ideal to the point of saying that it was the 
migrants’ choice to accept the potential ‘death penalty’ for crossing the bor-
der illegally. Countries of arrival are fully responsible for their border control 
and surveillance measures and indeed even offer incentives for migrants to 
come, whether they have proper documents or not. 
We hope that this book will provide new empirical material that can 
serve as a basis for an open and empirically based discussion of the interrela-
tions between immigration policies and migrants’ journeys. The articles con-
tained in this volume explore this issue from the joint perspective of political 
science and ethnography, an approach that has proved extremely fruitful. 
The resulting conclusions for policy making are clear: Governments 
need to take into consideration that negotiation partners may undermine the 
carrot-and-stick strategy and increase their demands concerning the EU’s 
externalization strategy. Rather than focusing on anti-immigration control 
alone, countries of arrival should act consistently across all policy sectors 
which affect countries of origin and transit. Governments would be wise to 
accept and communicate to their electorate the fact that hermetic borders will 
never prevent migrants from attempting to immigrate, but only make their 
journeys more dangerous. Policy makers should therefore reevaluate whether 
the immense costs and risks of their migration policies are acceptable. Re-
searchers and politicians should endeavor to develop and discuss alternative 
solutions for a more humane immigration policy that takes into account the 
active agency of migrants as well as the multilayered interests of their social 
and political environments. 
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